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STATE

LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES
THE CHANGING NATIONAL ECONOMY

AND

MONDAY,

JULY

AND

28, 1980

CONGRESS or THE UNITED STATES,
SPECIAL STUDY on ECONOMIC CHANGE
or THE JOINT ECONOMIC CoMMrrrEE,

Washington, D.U.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in room 2128,
Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Richard Bolling (vice chairman
of the cormnittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Bolling, Reuss, Long, and Mitchell.
Also present: John M. Albertine, executive director; Louis C.
Krauthoff II, assistant director-director, SSEC; Deborah Matz, Keith
B. Keener, and Mayanne Karmin, professional staff members; Mark R.
Policinski, minority professional staff' member; and Betty Maddox,
administrative assistant.
OPENING STATEMENT or REPRESENTATIVE BOLLING, VICE CHAIRMAN

I

would be
Representative BOLLING. The committee will be in order.
pleased if the witnesses would take their places at the table. One
of our witnesses will be here later.
am pleased to welcome the dis
tinguished witnesses here today.
As you may know, at this hearing, Roy Bahl, director of the Metro
politan Studies Program at Syracuse University, will present the
ﬁndings of his study “State and Local Government Finances and the
Changing National Economy.” This study was prepared for the Joint
Economic Committee’s Special Study on Economic Change, which
was initiated in 1977 to provide a long-range analysis of the Nation’s
economy and the implications of the future.
The various other papers undertaken for the Special Study have
either been completed or are in their ﬁnal stages of completion. While
they all explore and analyze important questions concerning the Na
tion’s future, the study on State and Local Government Finances is
of particular interest to me.
was ﬁrst sworn in as a Member of Congress,
Since 1949, when
have seen an explosion in the growth of intergovernmental
aid and
in the size and importance of the State and local government sector.
In 1950, State and local government expenditures represented 8 per
cent of our GNP, today it is approximately 14 percent; in 1950, Fed
eral grants to State and local governments totaled $2.3 billion, rep
resenting 10 percent of State and local government expenditures, in
1980, it is $89 billion or 25 percent of State and local government ex
penditures.
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Not only are State and local government expenditures more depend
ent on Federal aid, but the national economy is more likely to be
affected by changes in the State and local government sector as well.
In recent years, local and regional economies have been dramatically
altered by massive shifts in jobs and population. Many previously
thriving industrial cities have found plants closing, unemployment
rising, the middle class leaving, and their ﬁscal structures decaying.
Other cities experiencing rapid growth in population have found that
their stock of housing, schools, roads, and sewers is no longer adequate,
that services must be expanded, and crime is rising.
In attempting to deal with these problems, the various levels of
government continue to duplicate some functions and totally neglect
others. The intergovernmental system has become a morass of redtape,
forms, and mandates. Programs are developed largely on an ad hoc
basis with little regard for efficiency or coordination either between dif
ferent agencies or levels of government. Even a seemingly simple ef
fort, such as targeting based on need, has proven virtually impossible
to achieve because of competing local and regional interests within the
Congress.
The task before us is great indeed. But
believe one of the major
problems confronting the United States is that the Government does
not work very well—not just the Federal Government, but the Fed
eral Government in relation to other levels of government.
Of course the future of State and local government ﬁnance will di
rectly impact this relationship and also inﬂuence the state of our na
tional economy. At this point,
do not think we can talk about the
future of our national economy without considering the health of the
State and local sector. And, if the outlook for the State and local sector
is not bright, it seems to me that we must develop policies and programs
which are responsive to their needs.
be
say this not only because
lieve the Federal Government has an obligation to its subnational gov
ernments and their residents, but, moreover, because our national
economy cannot thrive if one of its vital organs is ailing.
I, therefore, ask you, our experts, what you foresee for our State
and local governments in the coming years and what actions you rec
ommend for the various levels of government to deal with the problems
before us ?
wish to ask if either of my col
Before
call on the witnesses,
leagues or both desire to make a statement.
Representative LONG. No, thank you.
Representative MITCHELL. No, thank you.
will proceed to call on the
Representative BOLLING. Thank you.
witnesses in alphabetical order and we will start With Mr. Roy Bahl.
We are delighted to have you.
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OF ROY BAHL, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AND DI
METROPOLITAN STUDIES PROGRAM, THE MAXWELL
SCHOOL, SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, SYRACUSE, N.Y.
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will just take
day,
important points.

a few minutes to

outline what

I think

are the most

BOLLING. Proceed exactly as you wish.
three issues. The ﬁrst is the set
of underlying factors that will shape the outlook for State and local
would like to venture what
government ﬁnances in the 1980’s. Second,
think probably will happen over the next 5 years. Third, will make
some suggestions about appropriate Federal, State, and local govern
ment policy in the face of what surely will be quite severe problems.
believe, as will
First, with respect to factors shaping the outlook,
most other witnesses who testify, that the performance of the national
economy is the crucial factor shaping the outlook for State and local
the growth
can offer some rough numbers:
government ﬁnance.
rate in GNP is between 3 and 3.5 percent on the average over the next
5 years, that would suggest that the rate of growth in State and local
government taxes will fall from about 4.3 percent to something on the
order of 3 percent annually. A reasonable guess might be that Federal
aid will fall from a growth rate of 7.3 percent per year to about 5 per
cent per year. Together, these possibilities suggest that the growth in
resources available to State and local govermnents will be about 25
percent lower in the ﬁrst 5 years of the 1980’s than it was from the
period 1965 through 1975. So the ﬁrst major factor shaping the outlook
is that there will be a lot less public money available.
The second factor shaping the outlook will be regional shifts in
economic activity. By most projections, including my own, the shift
to the Sunbelt will probably continue. It shows no signs of changing
in terms of the rate of movement of people, obs and income out of the
older Northeast and Midwest to the newer regions of the country. The
basic reasons why the shift in economic activity is going on are still
with us and include relative costs of doing business, people’s prefer
ences for where they live, energy cost and availability, and a number of
other factors.
vvhat is important here is what kind of ﬁscal adjustments have been
made.
would argue the ﬁrst round of adjustments to the Sunbelt
shifts have been made in many of the Northeastern States, but they
have been very difficult. They are difficult because these States face
very heavy ﬁxed commitments in the area of debt and pensions
because local government is very important in these States and it’s hard
to control the actions of a great number of local government, because
labor is more unionized, and because of the psychological problems of
lowering the high level of public services.
In the South, such adjustments are a newer problem. There will be
a slower rate of growth in terms of resources available to State and
local govermnents, but the shortfalls will not be as bad as in the North.
On the other hand, population growth creates pressures to expand in
frastructure and Southern States will feel that pressure. Sooner or
later, public sector unions will spread south as the Southern economy
looks more like the rest of the country—I should say the newer regions,
including the South and West. So rapid growth will have an effect on
the South and adjustments will be necessary there.
need not say much
The third factor is the limitation movement.
about it except that it should be considered at the Federal level, in
Representative

Mr. BAHL.

I would like to talk about
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terms of affecting the ﬂow of Federal moneys to State and local gov
ernments, and at the State and local government level where it will,
for a while, slow the amount of resources available-—-to local govern
ments in particular.
Finally, there is the question of revitalization. How much revitaliza
tion is going on in the big cities in this country ? The arguments go that
there are three trends to make us believe that cities will be-gin to re
vitalize themselves.
The ﬁrst is the changing demographics. There are more old people,
singles and childless couples, and the city is more attractive to these
groups because of amenities. Second, energy costs will make people
move closer to their jobs and back to the cities. Third, there is a bright
lights argument, such as cities are more interesting to live in because
offer more things to more people. There is not really very much
they ence that tliese factors are operating. As to the demographics,
evi
people may be postponing having children and schools will remain a
major problem in the cities.
energy costs are important and people
move closer to where they work, they will move to suburbs rather than
cities because that is where more people work. The bright lights argu
ment is a good case for Georgetown or Manhattan but hardly ﬁts
Syracuse or Utica, or any number of smaller cities where commuting
distances are not great. There is not much evidence of a revitalization
movement sweeping the country.
As far as the 1980’s, would venture a prognosis about what might
robably will result
happen. First, this slow growth in the economy
in a reduction in resources available to State and) local governments.
would guess more than a reduction of about a fourth in the rate of
increase in revenues ﬂowing to State and local governments in the
older regions of the country. Second,
think there will be defaults in
the ﬁrst 5 years of the 1980’s. It is important to note that there are a
lot of ways to default. There may well be defaults of the kind where
bondholders don’t receive payment, or these shortfalls may be covered
by short-term borrowing, or there may be an inability to meet other
commitments. There are more ﬁnancial disasters or emergencies ahead
in the next 5 years. am sure we all have our list of candidates.
Third, the capital obsolescence problem will grow in the cities. Cities
have been deferring investment in maintenance, in the renewal of their
capital stock, because of shortages of resources and because of com
peting claims on those resources. Those deferrals will continue, espe
cially now that the revenue situation is going to be so tight. It will
continue even more if there is a further slowdown in Federal moneys.
Fourth, one doesn’t need a crystal ball to know that some States will
amass considerable surpluses, those States that levy ad valorem taxes
on oil and gas resources. Fifth, there will be another catchup in public
employee compensation. vve talked about that pattern through the
1960’s and early 197 O’s as public employees caught up in terms of aver
age wage rates and pensions and other fringe beneﬁts. Now they have
fallen behind again.
One can’t believe that they will sit by and stay behind. So there will
be another wage catchup in the North. In the Southern St-ates, the
average State and local government wage rate is very low by compari
son with the rest of the country. As the South and the West grow in
think we will see an acceleration of the
terms of their income level,
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rate of compensation increase to public employees there. All of this
means that a lot of the resources available will go toward paying wage
would guess very little to be
rates to keep them up with inﬂation.
left over to increase real level services.
Effective tax rates will grow in many of the States in growing
regions, particularly those that don’t rely heavily on oil and gas re
sources. The limitation movement will probably not signiﬁcantly slow
the rate of growth in State and local spending after the next few years.
think that citizens probably recognize the thing that bothers them
most probably isn’t going to be solved by keeping taxes low.
As a result of all this, there probably will be much less emphasis,
by State and local governments, on redistributive services. The needs
to increase the rate of compensation and to meet the problems of a
deteriorating infrastructure will leave little to go around for income
distributive services. expect to see much less of an increase in spend
ing on health, education, and welfare than we did in the past decade.
would offer some very general suggestions here about
Finally,
policy. It seems to me that if we had a national urban policy to ad
dress this prognosis for the 1980’s, it would have four elements in it.
They are elements that didn’t read in the last national urban policy
or at least didn’t read them the way
wanted to.
First,
think there must be a clear statement about whether we are
talking about compensation or revitalization with respect to cities.
our argument is revitalization, we better be sure that subsidy programs
of one kind or another can work to revitalize cities.
would argue
there is not much evidence suggesting that such programs can increase
the population size of cities relative to their suburbs. Compensation
strategy would suggest there is an emptying-out process, a national
convergence in income and population shares that has to go on. While
this is going on, the Federal Government’s role ought to be to protect
the low income in the regions that are emptying out. Some kind of
transition policy is necessary.
Second, national urban policy should recognize the business cycle.
Everyone knows this problem and has talked about it again and again.
We need a countercyclical policy that comes into effect when we are in
a recession. not when we are out of it.
Third, Federal policy seems ambiguous about the role of State gov
ernment. State government has been bypassed, on the one hand, with
an enormous direct ﬂow of Federal money to cities. On the other hand,
there is a trend that suggests State government is becoming more and
more important in the sense of ﬁnancing a greater share of local serv
ices and directly spending for local services. Somehow there needs to
be elimination of this ambiguity. Will we make the States a full part
ner in the process and make them deal with problems such as city
suburb disparities or are they to somehow be left out of the Federal
State-local relationship?
Fourth, if there is anything that should be in a national urban
policy it is a statement of what we will do about default or major
ﬁnancial emergencies. The New York City crisis can be forgiven be
cause we had no experience with that kind of default since the depres
sion. So New York City was a special case. Then Cleveland was special.
Then Wayne County. How many special cases will there be before we
we get a policy, it must raise a couple
have some kind of policy?
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of questions. The ﬁrst is: vvhat are the conditions necessary for initial
Federal Involvement? Can we have a city on the verge of bankruptcy
while the State government is reducing taxes? It may be perfectly
but there needs to be some sort of Federal statement about

ﬁlgittimate,
a .

In addition, who will pay the

price of the cutback? Public employees
In the form of frozen wages? Citizens in the form of eliminated serv
ices? Bondholders
who must wait? Welfare recipients? These are
parts of a Federal policy. Maybe Federal policy simply says these are
not Federal matters.
Finally, there is the question of State and local government policy.
Vvhat
would say here,.if, for the moment, I could address only the
problem lI1 the
of the country, is that public services may
_older_ region
get far out of line With resources available to ﬁnance those services. In
New York State the level of income per capita is around 4 percent
above the
national average. On a per capita basis, State and local gov
ernments IN New York spend 40 percent above the national average.
That imbalance can’t be sustained.
The only solution to that is probably to lower the level of public
services. That is very tough as a policy to follow.
Representative BOLLING. That is why Congress doesn’t face up to
the policy.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bahl follows :]
_

I

PREPARED

STATEMENT or ROY BAHL‘

In this very brief statement, I would like to discuss the underlying factor which
shape the outlook for state-local government ﬁnances, offer an opinion about what

might be o.n_appI-opriate Federal, state and local government response to the
problems whicli surely lie ahead, and conclude with a forecast, or guess, about
the likely performance of state and local government ﬁnances in the 1980’s.
FACTORS

SHAPING THE OUTLOOK

That state and local governments everywhere are facing problems of adjust
ment is a reﬂection of the changing structure of the U.S. economy. A slowing
national income growth and a shift in its regional distribution, a continuing high
rate of price inﬂation, a changing population structure, changes in Federal bud

get and Federal grant policy and a new voter resistance to big government and
regulation all exert important pressures on the ﬁnancial condition of state and
local governments and all call for some form of policy responses by state and
local governments. In truth, the changes are less recent than some policy analysts
should be willing to admit—the slower rate of income and population growth has
been recognized for several years now as has the ongoing pattern of regional
shifts in population and economic activity. But old ﬁscal habits die slowly and
adjustments take time. The growth in government is just beginning to slow and
the realities of long-term retrenchment are only now taking hold in some juris
dictions in the declining regions. The reverse is true in the growing regions where
increasing costs and the pressures to upgrade services are beginning to affect
state and local government budgets.

National economic growth
The prognosis for the 1980’s is for real GNP to grow more slowly than in the
1960’s and 1970’s. Between 1970 and the ﬁrst quarter of 1980, real GNP growth
was positive in seven years and averaged 4.5 percent in those years. For the ten
Studies Program,
1Professor of Economics and Director, Metropolitan
The Maxwell
State
The statement is drawn from my larger manuscript,
School Syracuse University.
and Local Government Finances and the Changing National Economy,” prepared for the
expressed
views
here
Change.
The
Economic
Study
on
Special
Committee's
Joint Economic
are my own.

7
years of positive growth rates in the 1960’s, the average was 4.1 percent. Cer
tainly
next two years will
to approach this rate. The Administration
the
not begin
a real GNP decline 1n 1980 and a real growth of only 2.0 percent

ihlasggriozjected

Few will hazard outright projections of GNP ﬁve years in the future, but 4 to 5
percent real growth rates in the early 1980s seem unlikely. The Administration
estimates that in order to achieve a 4 percent unemployment rate by 1985 and
a 3 percent inﬂation rate by 1988, annual productivity
increases of 2.5 percent
and real GNP growth rates in the 4.5 to 5.0 percent range will be required. To the
extent these long-term inﬂation and unemployment targets are not attainable,
slower real income growth will result.
One important reason why the more optimistic scenarios such as the real growth
targets set by the Administration may not be reached is that the inﬂation rate
will likely remain high in the 1980’s. Some of the underlying causes of inﬂation
have been building for more than a decade and cannot be swiftly corrected. Others
are a result of world events—oil pricing and production decisions and crop
failures—and are not controllable.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics has made baseline projections of a 3.2 to 3.6
annual real growth rate in GNP for the 1980’s. Even these projections require
that inﬂation slow to 5.5 percent in the early 1980’s and to 4.4 percent by the
end of the decade, and that the unemployment rate gradually fall from a pro
jected 5.3 percent level in 1981 to 4.5 percent by 1990.“ CBO has simply assumed
(calculated) a 3.8 percent growth rate “. . . so that by 1985 the unemployment
rate would return to approximately the current level (5.9 percent).” ‘ The Joint
Economic Committee, assuming productivity increases in the 1.5 to 2 percent
range, sees the long-term rate of real GNP growth to be in the 3 to 3.5 percent
range.‘ From almost every vantage the conclusion seems to be the same. For at
least a few years, the U.S. economy is going to grow more slowly than it did
during the past two decades.
The combination of slower real growth and inﬂation will put new pressures
on state and local government budgets. Forecasts for the state and local govern
ment sector are not generally available, but it would seem reasonable to assume
that taxes will be off their post-1975 annual real growth rate of 4.3 percent. If
the past few years is representative and if tax limitation movements do not
further slow tax revenue growth, a 3.5 to 4 percent real GNP growth could imply
a state and local government tax revenue growth of 2.7 to 3.1 percent per year.
The resulting revenue gap will not likely be made up by increased Federal as
sistance. To the contrary, if the Federal grant share of GNP remains constant,
a 3.5 to 4.0 percent of real GNP growth will bring a 4.6 to 5.3 percent annual
increase in Federal grants. Even this projection, which seems on the optimistic
side, is for the growth well below the 7.3 percent annual real increase of the
1975-1978 period.
The import of all this seems clear. State and local governments will have less
resources available in the 1980’s—the overall rate of revenue increase could fall
by as much as one-fourth if the real GNP growth rate stays in the 3.5 to 4 percent
range.
Regional shifts in economic activity
The slowing down of national economic growth will be more than offset in
of economic activity. In the older declining
some regions by the inmigration
regions it will be reinforced. The prospects are for the movement of people and
jobs to the newer region to continue through the end of the century. Estimates
“
of regional population and income growth by the Department of Commerce and
Projections: Fiscal Years 1981-1985,”
Budget Office. “Five-Year
“Congressional
Budget
ng Office, 1980), p. 3.
(Washington, D.C. : U.S. Government Print
pt.
" in
‘Norman C. Saunders, “The U.S. Economy to 1990: Two Projections for Growth,
Projections for the 1980s.’ Bureau of Labo_r Statistics, U.S. Department
“Employment
of Labor, Bulletin 2030 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Oﬁlce, 1979), pp. 12-24’;
Budget Office, “Five Year Budget Projections: Fiscal Years 1981-1985
‘Congressional
(Washington, D.C. : Government Printing Office. 1980), pp. 2-5).
5 Joint Economic Committee, “The 1980 Joint Economic Report”
D.C. :
(Washington,
Government Printing Office, Feb. 28, 1980). pp. 30-32.
H
Population)
Council,
Projections
“1972 OBERS
(Series E
"US Water Resources
D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 1974); and Bureau of Economic
(Washington,
and
Earn
Analysis
Personal Income
Division, “Population,
Analysis, Regional Economic
to 2000 (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, Oc
by State: Projections
ingser 1977
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population

and employment growth by the Oak Ridge Laboratory ’ are
Census population projections offer a similar

in agreement on this outlook.

a

a

a

a

a
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prognosis.“
There may indeed be forces operating to slow regional shifts by improving the
comparative advantage of the older industrial states. If so, these turning points
are so recent that they have not been detected. A more likely prospect
for
continuation of the Sunbelt shift of the 1970s. Regional movements of population
and economic activity will pressure state and local governments to adjust their
ﬁscal behavior. For some Northern states the scenario will be continued, long
term retrenchment. As
State like New York attempts to bring its per capita
expenditures (40 percent above the U.S. average) into line with its per capita
income (4 percent above the U.S. average) the central issue becomes how to
lower the level of public services relative to other states. Few states have ex
perience with such matters. Yet governments in the Northern states are begin
ning to gain
comparative advantage in these matters, having gone through a
ﬁrst round of retrenchment. The political decisions to cancel some programs,
postpone others, and lay off employees are more easily made the second time
around.
Such an adjustment process is not only slow, but it is complicated by a number
of factors.
Inﬂation is driving up government costs faster than government revenues,
accentuating real service level declines.
Slower real income growth cuts into an already thin margin of revenue
coverage.
Many Northern states are characterized by highly decentralized ﬁscal
systems, hence it is difficult for the state government to plan for or control
the aggregate level of state and local government spending and taxing.
Because of jurisdictional fragmentation the ﬁscal position of central cities
in the declining regions is likely to be hurt a great deal more than that of
suburbs, i.e., much of the costs of retrenchment are ultimately paid by low
income families.
There are important psychological barriers to retrenchment—residents
ﬁnd
it much easier to adapt to lower taxes than to adapt to lower public service
levels.
The strength of public employee unions, ﬁxed debt and pension commit
ments, a backlog of needed infrastructure improvements, and the existing
near crisis ﬁnancial conditions of many cities make substantial retrench
ment an especially difficult process.
The net result of all this is that while regional shifts in economic activity de
mand that the formerly rich states bring their ﬁscal activities into line with
their new, relatively low levels of income, the retrenchment process probably in
period of public -sector atrophy in the North. This means that govern
volves
ments probably won’t and can’t cut back service levels in the absolute, but if
they do not raise tax burdens or expand the quality and quantity of services and
spend just enough to keep real per capita expenditures approximately constant,
in time the rest of the country will catch up. This process is long and slow, but
it is the kind of adjustment that is most likely to occur.
The growing regions will also face ﬁscal adjustment problems. On the one
hand, there is the great amount of rural poverty in the South and Southwest and
there is need to use substantial amounts of the revenues from growth to deal with
these problems_ Then there are the pressure from growing population and
improve school and health systems, deal with
income to expand infrastructure,
water shortages and environmental problems and control land use. The growing
regions would seem more equipped (than most Northern States) to deal with
these pressures, for number of reasons:
Resources are growing because of regional shifts, even though national
growth is slowing, and because tax structures in the growing regions tend to
be more inﬂation-sensitive
than those in the Northeast and Midwest.
’Oak Ridge National Laboratory, “Long-Term Projections of Population and Employ
ment for Regions of the United States" (Oak Ridge, Tennessee: December 1978); and,
Model of BEA Area Population
R. J. Olsen. et al., "Multiregion: A Simulation-Forecasting
and Employment”
(Oak Ridge. Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, October 1977).
“U.S. Bureau of the Census, “Population Projections of the United States: 1977
D.C.: Government
Reports, Series P25, No. 704 (Washington,
2050.” Current Population
Printing Office, July 1977).
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Government ﬁnances tend to be more state dominated and therefore more
controllable.
Many urban areas are not characterized by fragmented local government
structures.
Some states will experience substantial revenue growth with rising energy
prices.
On the other hand there are state and local government ﬁnancial problems
ahead for Southern states. Much of this increase in spending could come in the
form of a catch-up in average wages, hence expenditures may rise more rapidly
than public service levels. State and local government employment levels, relative
to population, are already higher in Southern than Northern states.
The Mmitation movement
It is not likely that the tax revolt movement which closed the 1970s signals a
permanent reversal in the growing share of government in GNP. But it seems
clear that ﬁscal limitations of one kind or another will be a signiﬁcant inﬂuence
on state and local government budgets during the next ﬁve years. By mid-1979,
thirty state legislatures were considering amendments calling for a balanced
Federal budget and 14 states passed some form of tax or expenditure limitation
between 1978 and 1980. The mood is clearly in the direction of slowing the growth
of government at all levels.
The explanations of this dissatisfaction are many: increasing tax burdens in
an inﬂationary period when real disposable income is falling, and high property
taxes head the list. Another source of discontent is what is perceived of as an
inefficient public sector—one that is thought to be overpaid, underworked, and
not responsive to citizen needs. Whatever the reasons for this dissatisfaction, it
seems likely that some state and local governments will be tied to personal income
growth in terms of what they are allowed to spend.
The effects of ﬁscal limitations, if they stick, will be to reduce the discretion
of government decision makers in formulating new programs and taxes and in
altering the timing of their own ﬁscal expansions and contractions. Even though
there is an option to switch to user charge ﬁnancing (a compensating device used
in the aftermath of California’s Proposition 13), it is clear that local ﬁscal
planning will be more constrained then in the past and new spending initiatives
will likely be bypassed to meet increased spending for “less controllable” budget
items.
It is less clear what the effect on aggregate state and local government ﬁscal
activity will be. On the surface, tieing tax and expenditure growth to personal
income growth would suggest a dampening effect. Yet 13 of the 14 states which
have imposed such limits are in the growing region—only Michigan is a declining
state. Hence even with limitations, a growth in taxes above the national rate of
income growth could occur (though one might speculate that it would be even
higher without the limitation). Moreover, in nearly every case the limitations
apply only to state government. In total, the effected governments account for
no more than one-fourth of total state and local government revenue raised from
own-sources. It is difficult to see how the limitations per se would signiﬁcantly
hold down aggregate state and local government spending.
Perhaps a more signiﬁcant effect on the budgets of state and local governments
is the possibility of limitations at the Federal level. Even without a legal indexing
of Federal expenditures, the tax revolt movement will bring pressure to balance
the Federal budget more frequently than has been the case in the past. Some of
this balancing will result in reduced resources available for Federal grant-in-aid
programs and in a further dampening effect on state and local government
revenues.
The limitation movement gained some momentum in 1978 and 1979, and still
more states will probably adopt varying kinds of controls on their budget growth.
But inﬂation, public employee wage demands. Federal assistance cuts and slow
economic growth will eventually catch up with some limitation states and stall
the movement in others. The limitation and austerity concerns of this year could
give way to a renewed worry over deﬁcient public service levels by the mid-1980s.
State legislatures will eventually reason that limitations
aren’t going to
address the underlying problem of an inefficient public sector that so rankles
many taxpayers, nor is it clear that it will stimulate local economic development
as others hope. Further, limitations may cause state and local governments to
make revenue-raising adjustments such as increased use of beneﬁt charges and
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the creation of special districts. Such policies may well be in the public interest
under many circumstances, but not likely if their adoption is justiﬁed as a way
around a formal limitation. The adjustments by state and local governments
to circumvent debt limitations, and the efficiency and controllability of these
agency arrangements, is a lesson worth remembering.

Revitalization
Some observers of urban problems see a revitalization of central cities taking
place. It is not usually made clear whether revitalization means increased city
population, employment and income, an improved economic position of the central
city relative to suburbs, or simply a physical rehabilitation of certain parts of
the inner city. Some, who borrow the term “gentriﬁcation” from the British, see
it as the process of ﬁltering housing (or neighborhoods and retail districts)
upward from working class to professional middle class. Whatever the meaning,
the implication is that the inner cities of the future will be much less the dis"
tressed areas that they now are and that Federal policy toward cities ought to be
adjusted accordingly. Indeed, some public policy is premised on the ability to
induce more employment and residential activity in depressed inner city areas.
A national development bank and tax abatements for construction investments
in blighted areas are good examples.
The revitalization argument is made on a basis of a priori reasoning, casual
observation, and wishful thinking. It has several elements. First, the changing
demographics may favor central cities over suburbs. More singles, childless
couples and elderly in the national population mix; the demand for rental hous
ing, smaller and less expensive housing; and the convenience of city living (mass
transit, walk to shopping, etc.) will bring people back to the city. Moreover, the
deterrent of poor public schools in central cities will be less important for families
without children. Second, the energy crisis will favor the city. Worker will move
closer to work-—and perhaps to where mass transit is available—to avoid the
longer and more expensive commute. Third, there is the “bright lights of the city”
argument. Cities are exciting places to live with more cultural and social activi
ties, and some new awareness of these beneﬁts will bring back white collar,
middle income workers. Finally, there are the agglomeration effects which make
the city a competitive location for certain types of white collar and service
business activities. As evidence of revitalization, proponents give many examples:
a booming Manhattan, Chicago’s loop, and Capital Hill-like neighborhood revivals
in most large cities.
Acceptance of the revitalization arguments as a basis for policy making is
better than wishing on a star. But not much. There is little evidence that city
populations are increasing, that their relative (to suburbs) income and employ
ment levels are rising or that their disadvantaged are better off. Indeed, none of
these patterns have materialized. Central cities declined in population by about
5 percent between 1970 and 1978, they declined as a share of metropolitan area
population and employment, and the city/suburb per capita income disparity
has grown.
If there has been a back-to-the-city movement, it has been dwarfed by the
effects of those factors which stimulate decline. Even the a priori arguments
on revitalization seem ﬂawed. There is some appeal to the notion that childless
couples and singles see the city as a desirable location because they are not de
terred by poor quality schools and because of proximity to amenities and work.
Yet the postponement of having children does not necessarily mean that couples
will remain childless or that children will not be planned for. Indeed, some
have argued that the fertility rate in the United States will soon begin to in
crease. If this occurs, the quality of the public schools remains a major draw
back to city residential location choices. Locations closer to amenities may also
he a comparative disadvantage of cities, e.g., most cities cannot compete with
the convenience and choice of suburban shopping centers and in all but a few
large cities, the mass transit system would not seem a major inducement.
The energy argument might be questioned. There are more suburban than
central city job locations hence if the rising price of gasoline induced any popu
lation movement, it may well be to suburban locations. Moreover, if the commute
to work grew too expensive, other kinds of adjustments might be made: e.g., a
four-day workweek or innovations in communications
to minimize necessary
personal contact. To the extent movement took place in response to commuting
costs, it would likely be blue collar manufacturing workers moving to suburbs.
Some white collar workers might be lured to the city, but again the quality of
the public schools would be an important impediment.
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The “brightlights” argument is based on a notion of cities being exciting cen
ters of cultural and social activity which make city living more exciting. The im
pression is true enough, perhaps, for a Manhattan or a Georgetown but would
hardly seem to ﬁt Syracuse or Toledo.
This is not to argue that revitalization is undesirable, that cities should not be
brought back. Rather it is an argument for care in deﬁning revitalization and
for realism in assessing what can happen in cities during the next decade. Re
vitalization can mean a conservation of capital facilities, reinvestment in blighted
areas and a general improvement in the quality of city life. This pattern would be
perfectly consistent with shrinking population and employment, the displace
of the poor from dilapidated housing in rundown neighborhoods, and the
ment
employment. Revitalization of cities, in this
continued loss of manufacturing
sense, may be a reasonable expectation. But it will not mean a diminished need
for Federal help in compensating for the economic losses, subsidizing the dis
enfranchised and generally getting through a tough adjustment period.
FEDERAL

POLICY

The Federal government will play a major role in getting state and local gov
ernments through the difficult ﬁscal adjustment period which lies ahead. ‘The
question is whether the Federal response will be reasoned and comprehensive or
ad hoc and piecemeal. It seems essential that some general guidelines for the Fed
eral response be worked out, i.e., the kind of strategy one might expect to ﬁnd in
a well though out statement of National Urban Policy. In the absence of such a
statement, some very rough generalizations about how such a policy might view
the ﬁnancial problems of state and local governments is offered here. These
generalizations might be framed as four questions about the appropriate Federal
response to urban problems; whether the Federal government ought to attempt
of declining areas or compensation during a period of ﬁnancial
revitalization
adjustment;
whether inﬂation and recession ought to be viewed as a part of
intergovernmental policy; what role should state governments play in the in
tergovernmental system, and what will be the Federal policy toward the big
city ﬁnancial disasters which may lie ahead.
Compensation versus revitalization
If the Administration’s Urban Policy statement of 1978 took any ﬁrm position,
it was toward a revitalization rather than a compensation strategy.” The Na
tional Development Bank, the targeted employment tax credit, Neighborhood
Commercial Reinvestment programs and expanded UDAG funding all seemed
to lean toward renovating a deteriorated economic base in distressed cities. At
least the rhetoric of Federal policy would imply a belief that the declining econ
omies can be revitalized. Yet there is little evidence that such programs work or
have any effect on the employment base of declining cities.
A compensation policy would take a different tack. It would accept the notion
that market forces are affecting a reallocation of population and income within
the country and attempt to compensate the most ﬁnancially pressed governments
and families caught in this transition. The goal would be to protect particularly
the low income by subsidizing both the provision of public services and tempo
rary job opportunities while the emptying out process goes on. Public service
job programs, categorical grants in the health and education area and Federal
relief of welfare ﬁnancing would be key elements of such a program.
strategies and one
There is a ﬁne line between revitalization and compensation
wants to be careful not to confuse the latter with any program to abandon cities
of doing
or declining regions. As interregional variation in the relative costs
in popula
business and in market size approach some new balance, movements
the most
tion and jobs will slow. A primary role of Federal policy is to assist
to
Hence,
hold
distressed governments during the adjustment process.
subsidies
compensation strategy, if
businesses in a region are not an appropriate part of a
present
levels)
at
operations
it is known that the business will leave (or cease
with an overdeveloped
when the subsidy is removed. “Transition” grants to states
they are tied to longer term
public sector, such as New York, are appropriate if
activity. Capital grants to renew the
reductions in the level of public sector
if the infrastructure investment is
appropriate,
also
are
city’s infrastructure
9 “New Partnership to Conserve America’s
Secretary, Mar. 27, 1978, P- 9

Communities,”

Office of the White House Press
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based on a “shrinkage” plan. Finally, relocation grants and labor market informa
tion systems are perfectly consistent with such a strategy in that they facilitate
the outmovement.
The business cycle and intergovernmental policy
The business cycle and inﬂation have dramatic effects on the ﬁnancial health
of state and local governments. Indeed, it was the severity of the last recession
that pushed New York City over the edge and brought many other local govern
ments and at least one state dangerously close to ﬁscal insolvency. Because swings
in economic activity do induce substantial changes in relative ﬁscal health, one
might argue for an explicit recognition of business cycle effects in Federal inter
governmental policy.
In a sense this was done with countercyclical aid and the stepping up of other
components of the Economic Stimulus Package in the last recovery, but it was
done in an ad hoc manner rather than as part of a coordinated Federal inter
governmental policy. The basic objectives of CETA were initially training and
employment of the disadvantaged and then countercyclical stimulus, and Local
Public Works was meant to stimulate state and local government construction.
Some would argue that both became general purpose ﬁscal relief programs, and
that neither exerted a strong stimulative effect on the economy. Indeed, if the
primary purposes of these programs were training and economic stimulus,
neither will pass muster in terms of an evaluation of their success.
Apparently,
little was learned from this experience about the relationship
between countercyclical policy and national urban policy. The fact is that with
the United States economy into another recession, there is not a ﬁrm counter
cyclical policy.
If business cycles were linked to intergovernmental policy, an essential feature
of the system would have to be targeting on relatively more distressed jurisdic
tions. This raises the especially thorny problem of identifying those communities
most hurt by recession, and the severity of the recession in the various regions.
The evidence of the past two recessions seems clear—the older manufacturing
belt in the Northeast and Midwest was hit hardest. Expectations are for a similar
regional impact of this recession.
The role of State governments
An ambivalencikat the Federal level—about the “proper” role of state gov
ernment in state and local government ﬁnances may exacerbate some of the
problems created by inﬂation and a slower growing economy.
State governments raised 58 percent of all state and local government taxes,
made 40 percent of direct expenditures and accounted for 72 percent of Federal
aid in ﬁscal year 1978. Yet state government seems to be approaching a new
crossroads—a redeﬁnition of its ﬁscal role. The past decade has seen two ini
portant, but contradictory, inﬂuences on state government ﬁnancing and service
delivery. The ﬁrst is in respect of its relationship with the Federal government
system. Total grants-in-aid have quad
and its place in the intergovernmental
rupled since 1970, but much of this growth has been in direct Federal to local
grants. with the states being bypassed. In 1978, local governments were directly
receiving 28 percent of total Federal aid to state and local governments, as com
pared with 13 percent in 1970. This policy of direct Federal-local relations is not
inconsistent with the view from some state capitols that city ﬁnancial emer
gencies are as much Federal as state government responsibilities. Now, as the end
of the General Revenue Sharing authorization
approaches, the Administration
has recommended elimination of the state share. Whether or not state govern
ments have brought this change on themselves by abrogating their responsibility
toward urban governments is debatable, but the drift toward reducing the
importance of state government in the intergovernmental
process seems real
enough.
The second way in which the state role is changing is in the continuing shift
of ﬁnancial responsibility from local to state governments. The state govern
ment’s share of total state and local government taxes collected rose from 50.7
percent to 58.5 percent between 1965 and 1978, and the state’s share of direct
expenditure increased from 34.9 to 39.5 percent. -The state aid share of total
state expenses remained about constant between 1965 and 1978, but the state
government share of health, education and welfare direct spending increased
markedly. States may not have done all that they should to lift the ﬁnancing
burden off the local property tax, and too little may have been done about city/
suburb ﬁscal disparities, but the trend toward more government tax or expendi
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ture limitations, a more elastic state government tax structure and high rates of
inﬂation could accentuate this trend.
In fact, the increased Federal-local aid ﬂow may have slowed the trend toward
state ﬁnancial assumption. Before 1975, state aid had behaved as though it were
a highly elastic tax, i.e., for every 1 percent increase in personal income, there
was a 1.6 percent increase in state aid to local governments. That responsiveness
fell to 0.96 percent in 1976 and 0.69 in 1977.
With resources limited, it seems imperative to develop a less ambiguous Fed
eral position about the role and responsibility
of state governments. Is ﬁscal
centralization
to be encouraged or not and should states—as a prerequisite to
Federal assistance—be required to deal with the city/suburb disparities problem?

Default and emergency loans
Financial emergencies if not default lie ahead for many large cities.

If

it

does

nothing else, a national urban policy ought to outline the Federal response to
such crises. Dealing with New York City on an ad hoc basis was excusable—there
had been little reason to be concerned with municipal default since the depres
sion. In many respects the New York City crisis of 1975 was a special case. But
how many special cases can there be before a policy response must be made?
Cleveland and Wayne County have much in common with New York City in
terms of weaknesses in the underlying economy, as do many of the other cities
which commonly appear on the distressed lists.
Two questions are essential in formulating a Federal policy toward distressed
cities. The ﬁrst involves deﬁning the conditions necessary for initial Federal
intervention, i.e., what avenues must be exhausted before emergency Federal
subsidy is warranted? The second is what adjustments must the city make as a
condition of receiving the aid. Neither question seems to have been clearly
thought through and neither is to be found in the Administration’s
Urban Policy
Statement.
On the ﬁrst issue, one might query the role of state government as having a
prior responsibility for city ﬁnancial problems. Should there be an emergency
loan to New York City when New York State runs enough of a surplus to cut
taxes? Some would argue that the Clevelands and Detroits are primarily the
business of the Ohios and the Michigans and Federal bailouts are a last desperate
resort. The view from the Statehouse is likely to be quite different. State govern
ments could well argue that a combination of local autonomy, Federal mandates
and direct Federal-local aids have taken much of the potential for control of
local ﬁscal excesses out of their hands.
Federal actions stimulated the local ﬁscal and may have created some of the risk
of default, hence, the Federal government should participate as at least an
equal partner in the bailout. The state argument seems strong. In order to re
quire states to shoulder more responsibility for the ﬁscal problems of their local
governments, the Federal government must be less ambiguous about the role of
system. If states are to have ﬁrst
state government in the intergovernmental
claim on ﬁlling the ﬁnancing gap of cities facing ﬁnancial emergencies they might
reasonably argue for more control over service level mandates and resources
passing through to the local level. The elimination of the state share of General
Revenue Sharing would hardly seem a step in this direction.
If cities’ ﬁnancial conditions are to be viewed independently of state govern
ment, then a set of criteria for local ﬁscal actions which must be taken prior to
Federal intervention should be established. These might include emergency tax
levels, program and employment cutbacks, a wage freeze, and perhaps debt
rescheduling.
The second issue is how far will local governments be required to go in altering
their ﬁscal behavior as a condition for continuing to receive an emergency loan
or grant, and how will the ﬁscal improvements be monitored? The most important
question to be resolved is how will the Federal government opt to distribute
the burden of an austerity program. Employee layoffs and wage freezes will lay
much of the burden on public employees, program cutbacks and tax increases
on citizens and bond repayment stretch-outs or moratoriums on bondholders.
A Federal policy which accommodates a bailout in a period of emergency, will
implicitly or explicitly make such choices.
Another alternative is to make it clear that the Federal government will not
rescue cities from default, even in the case of the most severe emergencies. Even
as a statement of national policy it would be difficult to make this believable with
the history of New York City., Lockheed and Chrysler. But if local and state
governments were convinced that a borrower of last resort was not available,
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their ﬁnancial

practices may become much more conservative and their ﬁscal
strategies more risk averse. Whether that would be in the national interest is
precisely the sort of question a reasoned national urban policy should address.
STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT

POLICY

A National Urban Policy is essential. State and local government ﬁnancial
problems will materialize in the 1980s and a coordinated Federal response will
be imperative. Yet most of the required adjustments will fall to state and local
governments, the vast majority of which are neither distressed nor ﬂush.
The ﬁscal fates of state and local governments will be determined largely by
factors outside their control-—inﬂation, the performance of the national economy,
and the level and distribution of Federal grants. Still, state and local govern

ments have considerable discretionary powers to inﬂuence their ﬁnancial health
during this period of adjustment.
The most popular reform is to offer a program for productivity increases. It
is popular because it does not cost the taxpayer, can be used as a basis for re
warding public employees and best of all, its success or failure can’t be measured.
The need for and possibilities of state and local government employee produc
tivity increases make great discussion material, but they do not balance budgets.
A second strategy is the use of tax and subsidy policy to stimulate regional
development. State and local governments in both growing and declin
economic
ing regions attempt to improve their competitiveness as a business location by
oﬂfering various kinds of subsidies, e.g., tax abatements, tax holidays, subsidized
loans, grants of land, etc. Whether these subsidies have actually contributed to
local economic development is as debatable as the issue of whether the induced
revenue gains from new business have exceeded the expenditure costs.
Probably the most important strategy in which governments in the declining
region can participate is retrenchment, i.e., the adjustment of public service
levels and the growth in expenditures to properly reﬂect capacity to ﬁnance. Re
trenchment involves cuts in service levels and employment, a more realistic look
at the kinds of compensation and beneﬁt levels that can be afforded, and a careful
conservation of those capital resources that are available. With respect to the
latter, one would expect to see a great deal more emphasis placed on maintenance
and renovation of the existing capital stock than on the construction of new
capital facilities. The austerity programs in some cities have included these
kinds of adjustments, but other public policies have been surprising. Relative
tax burdens have gone up in the declining region, the ﬁscal limitation movement
has pretty much been limited to the sunbelt, and public employment rolls in the
declining region have expanded in the past two years.
In the growing regions, local governments also face serious adjustment prob
budgets. The
lems which will require them to carefully plan the growth in their
problems are essentially how much should a government grow and _how fast
might
should this growth occur. The mistakes of governments in the older region
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Some local governments-mostly

but not exclusively

large cities in the

North—will either default or come to the point of being unable to meet their
expenditures commitments. A round of public employee layoffs—reminiscent
of 1975—76—will probably take place.
Despite the recognition of capital obsolescence problems, the quality of the
capital stock, especially in the older regions, will continue to deteriorate.
Higher interest rates, inﬂation, reduced Federal aids and pressing ﬁnancial
problems all will push state and local governments to further ‘defer’ capital
construction,

maintenance and renovation.
some of the oil and gas rich states will experi
ence extraordinary
revenue increases, and amass considerable surplus funds.
The next ﬁve years will see another catch-up in public employee compensa
tion rates. This lagged effect of recent years deferred compensation increases
will be further stimulated by the current high inﬂation rate, and will
account for virtually all of the public expenditure increases of some jurisdic
tions. The increase in average wages will be especially rapid in the South
where average wages are relatively
lower and where unionization
is
increasing.
Relative levels of tax burdens will rise in many states in the growing
regions in response to increasing costs and service quality, and will decline
in the Northeast as austerity programs begin to take hold.
The limitation movement will not signiﬁcantly slow the rate of state and
local government spending after the early 1980s.
Federal policy toward state and local government ﬁnances will remain
ad hoc, and there will be no guiding principles. The overall level of Federal
grants (in real terms) will likely decline and less targeting might be ex
pected during the next ﬁve years as the growing region more forcefully
makes its point about the ﬁscal needs related to rural poverty.
The near-term future likely holds less emphasis by state and local govern
activities. Social service program expansions will
ments on redistributive
take a back seat to capital maintenance and renovation needs and public
employee compensation and the recent rate of income tax increase will not
be maintained.
These guesses would be altered by either a coherent Federal government policy
toward state and local government ﬁnances or by a better performing United
States economy. In the last analysis there could be no better National Urban
Policy than a low inﬂation rate and a strong growth in GNP.
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